Security trade-offs have been established for one-way bit commitment in Ref. [1] . We study this trade-off in two selection settings. We show that for an 'abelian' selection rule (exemplified by particle conservation) the standard trade-off between sealing and binding properties still holds. For the nonabelian case (exemplified by angular momentum conservation) the security trade-off can be more subtle, which we illustrate by showing that if the bit-commitment is forced to be ancilla-free an asymptotically secure quantum bit commitment is possible.
Introduction
The question of whether the no-go result for quantum bit commitment [2] remains valid in the presence of (super)selection rules has been addressed by several recent papers [3] , [4] , [5] . The most general result is described in Ref. [4] where the authors prove that secure quantum bit commitment is impossible under general (super)selection rules. The authors of this paper distinguish security in the case of 'abelian' (super)selection rules (such as particle conservation) and 'nonabelian' (super)selection rules where the imposed symmetry is described by a non-abelian group. In both cases the authors prove the impossibility of establishing a secure bit-commitment protocol. In this paper we point out that the no-go result for the non-abelian case is fairly non-trivial; we show that if the cheating strategies are forced to be ancilla-free, an asymptotically secure protocol can be found. In contrast, for the abelian case (or in the absence of selection rules) the 'no-ancilla' enforcement does not alter the security trade-offs for a one-way bit-commitment (called a 'purification bit commitment' in Ref. [1] ).
One-way Bit Commitment Protocol
We repeat the definition in Ref. [1] of this important class of bit commitment (BC) protocols: Definition 1 (One-Way Bit Commitment Protocol, BC) [1] This is certainly not the most general quantum bit commitment protocol which may involve more than one round of communication. The security trade-offs of one-way BC protocols have been described as follows, see Ref. [1] . Two scenarios are considered: 1) Alice is honest, but Bob tries to cheat by learning the bit in the commit phase. 2) Bob is honest, but Alice tries to cheat by changing her committed bit after the commit phase. In case 1), Bob is trying to make his "information gain" G(S B ) nonzero, defined as the difference between his probability of estimating Alice's commitment correctly in the commit phase when he employs cheating strategy S B , and when he is honest,
In case 2), Alice is trying to make her "control" C(S A ) nonzero, defined as the difference between her probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires when she implements S A , and when she is honest,
Then, the security of any given protocol can be characterized by the maximum of these two quantities:
For one-way bit commitment protocols it can easily be established [1] that
where F (., .) is the fidelity function and D(., .) is the trace-distance function. Notably, the cheating strategies that achieve these optima do not make use of ancillas: Alice's cheating strategy is the creation of a b−independent state potentially followed by unitary rotation, whereas Bob's cheating strategy is a complete von Neumann measurement projecting in the eigenbasis of ρ 0 − ρ 1 , achieving the trace-distance. 
One-way Bit Commitment with Selection Rules
To proceed with this analysis, we must stipulate how the one-way bit commitment protocol is constrained by selection rules. We assume that Alice and Bob's actions have to obey a local superselection rule which can be given by a Hermitian operator K A and K B . We will discuss two examples here: 1) K A/B is the local particle number N A/B . 2) K A/B is a local total angular momentum operator J 2 A/B ; this is a 'nonabelian' case (the symmetry group is that of space rotations).
Here are then the restrictions that we will require for the one-way bit commitment:
1. The states in the token+proof Hilbert space in Alice's lab are eigenvectors of K A with the same eigenvalue, say k. Thus, If the cheating strategy is not required to be ancilla-free, Bob could create a state of definite quantum number k in his lab before he receives the token. After he has received the token, he should respect the conservation rule on his total token+ancilla space, but the ancilla may still help him to do a better measurement.
Let us use the following notation: since a one-way BC protocol is completely specified once the orthogonal pair | χ 0,1 is agreed upon, we will refer to this protocol as BC(| χ 0,1 ). If the protocol has the above selection rule restrictions imposed involving operator K, we will refer to this protocol as BC K (| χ 0,1 ). If the protocol is forced to be ancilla-free we write AFBC K (| χ 0,1 ).
Our results
We find that in the presence of particle number selection rules, the security of one-way BC is rigorously unchanged, see Section 5:
However, in the presence of angular momentum selection rules (operator J 2 ; a 'nonabelian' case), a one-way BC with arbitrarily high security can be devised if we force the scheme to be ancilla-free
We do not have a rigorous proof of the statement about the asymptotic behavior of C max (AFBC J 2 (| χ 0,1 )), but we conjecture a formula for the fidelity function which coincides with numerical data up to j = 11 which give rise to the asymptotic security, see Section 6.
Particle Conservation
We now prove Eq. (6). In Ref.
[5] Mayers first proved the simplest case in which the fact that the protocol is completely sealing makes it completely unbinding, i.e. Alice can always change her commitment. The arguments here are a straightforward extension of this simple case. The number operator is additive over tensor product Hilbert spaces, so we can write
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This means that if, as we assume, N | χ 0,1 = n| χ 0,1 , then these states must have the form
that is, if the token system has m particles, the proof system must have n − m particles. The labels i p and i t denote other quantum numbers characterizing the states. It is understood that the range of the i t and i p sums can depend on m (i.e., they depend on the local particle number). The security parameters defined above depend only on the reduced density operators on the token subsystem of the two states. For the states of the form of Eq. (9), these can be written as
where p b,m is the probability of each m, andσ b,m is a normalized density operator in each m sector:
Consider what happens if Bob cheats. The ideal optimal measurement for Bob that he can do to achieve Eq. (4) is a complete von Neumann measurement in the eigenbasis of ρ 0 − ρ 1 . But, because of Eq. (10), this eigenbasis is also an eigenbasis of the particle number of the token system and given the superselection rule, Bob is allowed to do this optimal measurement. So, Bob can gain exactly the same amount of information in the protocol constrained by selection rules, G max (BC N (| χ 0,1 )) = G max (BC(| χ 0,1 )).
Next, we consider what happens if Alice cheats.
We will show that C max (BC N (| χ 0,1 ) = C max (BC(| χ 0,1 ). First of all, due to the block-diagonal character of ρ 0 and ρ 1 we can write
On the other hand, Uhlmann's theorem for the fidelity function F is also written as:
We arrive at this last form by recognizing that U p can have any arbitrary global phase. In Ref. [1] it is shown that C = | χ 0 |U p ⊗ I t | χ 1 |/2 can be achieved if Alice creates the b-independent state
prior to the commit phase. If she decides during the commit phase that b = 0, she leaves that state unchanged and sends it to Bob; if she wants b = 1, she applies the optimal U † p of Eq. (12) to the proof system that she still holds.
But in the presence of the charge selection rule, it is not possible to do the unconstrained maximization of Eq. (12); we must respect constraints 2. and 3. above imposed by the selection rules, which require that U p be block diagonal in the charge index. We observe that Alice can create the cheating state χ of Eq. (13) while respecting the selection rule. Thus we can write C max in this case as a constrained maximization:
In order to evaluate this expression, we rewrite the states of Eq. (9) as
Putting (15) into (14) and working out the expression gives
In other words, we obtain the claimed inequality C max (BC N (| χ 0,1 ) = C max (BC(| χ 0,1 ).
We will now find a very different situation for angular-momentum conservation.
Angular Momentum Conservation
We introduce a family of one-way bit commitment protocols, one for each total angular momentum quantum number j (2j ∈ Z + ). Alice's two states χ 0,1 are states with total angular momentum j tot = j and m tot = j. We denote the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients as C(j A , m A , j B , m B , j tot , m tot ) where j A , m A are the quantum numbers of the 'proof' spin (kept by Alice, initially) and j B , m B are the quantum numbers of the 'token' spin (sent to Bob). Unlike the number operator, total angular momentum is not an additive quantity (herein lies the crucial difference between the security of the two cases), i.e. the two local angular momenta j A and j B can give rise to total angular momentum between |j A − j B | and j A + j B . We take states for fixed j to be
The β-coefficients obey the following constraints:
The first equation is normalization and the second equation is enforced by the orthogonality of χ 0 and χ 1 . Before considering Alice's strategies which impose further constraints on the β-coefficients, let us consider Bob's cheating strategies. Due to the selection rule his measurement has to be diagonal in the total angular momentum of his particle which implies that he will not be able to detect any difference in the terms of ρ 0 and ρ 1 that are off-diagonal in the j B -basis. The states χ b (j) are chosen such that the on-diagonal terms of ρ 0 and ρ 1 are identical. This implies that for all j, G max (AFBC J 2 (| χ 0,1 )) = 0. In order to analyze Alice's cheating ability, we work out the expression for the fidelity F in Eq. (5) which provides an upper bound on her cheating strategies. Note that the expressions for χ b have the Schmidt form: are normalized orthogonal vectors:
and Schmidt coefficients which are independent of the bit b:
Also note that for these states φ
where
With these tools, Uhlmann's fidelity can be written as
where s m A = sign(K m A ) and thus
We arrive at a piecewise linear program: determine the vector β which minimizes F under the constraints given by Eq. (21). For completeness, let us state the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients as they appear in the expression for K m A :
(That is, a binomial coeficient outside its usual range should be taken to be zero.)
Numerical Analysis
For each integer j we have investigated this piecewise linear program numerically. (We do not report the half-integer j results here, they work out similarly.). We have done the minimization up to j = 11 and we observe the following patterns. As it turns out, in all solutions we find that β k = 0 for j + 2 ≤ k ≤ 2j. Secondly, in every case, the terms in Eq. (28) for m A > 0 are identically zero. This gives us a set of linear equalities for β j B : 
Thirdly, in alternating cases (j even or j odd), we find that s −1 and s 0 are {+1, −1} and {−1, +1}. In addition, the remaining terms in Eq. (28), for m A < −1, are also identically zero. For example, the solutions for j = 1, 2, 3 are 7
• j = 1: β 0,1,2 = { • j = 2: β 0,1,2,3,4 = { Most importantly, we have observed that for all cases up to j = 11, we find optimal values of F that agree with the simple formula:
As is clear from this formula, which we conjecture to correspond to a feasible solution for the β-vector, F rapidly goes to zero as j → ∞ which implies the security of the protocol.
